The composition and functioning of corporate boards is at the core of the academic and policy debate on optimal corporate governance. But does board composition matter for corporate decisions? In this paper, we analyze the role of financial experts on boards. In a novel panel data set on board composition, we find that financial experts significantly affect corporate decisions, though not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. First, when commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity diminishes. But, the increased financing affects mostly firms with good credit and poor investment opportunities. Second, investment bankers on the board are associated with larger bond issues, but also worse acquisitions. Third, we find little evidence that financial expertise matters for compensation policy or for experts without affiliation to a financial institution. The results suggest a tradeoff between outside incentives (e.g. bank profits) and the incentive to maximize firm value. Requiring financial expertise on boards, as mandated by regulatory proposals, may not benefit shareholders if conflicting interests are neglected.
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Much of the recent corporate-governance debate revolves around the composition of corporate boards. The question is which types of directors can be expected to serve the interests of shareholders. Following the recent wave of accounting scandals, regulators have stressed the need for more financial experts on boards. The implicit assumption is that "an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements" will lead to better board oversight and serve the interest of shareholders. 1 Financial experts, however, might affect firm policies beyond more accurate disclosure and better audit committee performance. Directors spend a significant portion of their time on advising rather than monitoring (Adams and Ferreira (2003) ). This influence can be problematic if directors are affiliated with financial institutions and pursue the interests of those institutions rather than maximizing shareholder value. Affiliation has raised concerns in several areas of financial intermediation, such as analyst recommendations and IPO allocations.
2 Nevertheless, recent regulatory efforts to increase financial expertise on boards do not preclude such conflicts. As Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) enacts a very broad definition of financial expertise, 3 bankers remain a common type of financial expert on corporate boards. 4 In this paper, we ask whether directors with financial expertise influence corporate policies and whether affiliation hampers their advisory role. We analyze both internal investment (capital expenditure) and external investment (mergers and acquisitions), using a novel data set on the board composition of 282 companies over 14 years.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we study the impact of financial experts on internal investment and on the financing of investment with bank loans. We examine all financial experts, but focus on commercial bankers. One hypothesis is that, if 1 See Section 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act (definition of audit committee financial experts). Similarly, all major stock exchanges have introduced listing requirements on director financial literacy. See also the governance survey by Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004) , e.g. recommendation R-36.
2 Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) ; Reuter (2005) . 3 The original SOX proposal had a more restrictive definition of financial expert, which would have only included CPAs and people with direct accounting experience. The objection from the business community (e.g. "Blue Ribbon Commissions"), which led to the softening of the definition, was that the pool of experts is too small, especially if bankers were to be excluded. (See Tenorio, 2003; Stuart, 2005) . In our sample, accountants make up only 0.5% of directors. CFOs make up 1%. 4 According to CFO Magazine's analysis (Stuart, 2005) , roughly 30% of boards (among the Fortune 100) identified a director who is "an evaluator of financial statements, such as a banker or investor," an executive who merely supervised the finance or accounting function, or a director with "no discernible professional experience in finance" as their financial expert for the purpose of compliance with SOX.
2 firms are financially constrained due to information asymmetries (Myers and Majluf (1984) ; Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) ), bankers enable firms to finance valuecreating projects they would otherwise forgo. In that case, bankers decrease the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds. 5 An alternative hypothesis is that bankers provide loans even when it is not in the interest of shareholders. Lending to unconstrained firms with low default risk -even if they have no value-creating projectsmay increase bank profits. And it may enable empire-building or overconfident managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986) ; Malmendier and Tate (2005) ) to divert funds or to overinvest. Such arrangements are more likely if the lending bank is represented on the board so that the board is unlikely to intervene. In this case, investmentcash flow sensitivity also decreases, but mostly in financially unconstrained firms.
We test these hypotheses empirically. We find that when commercial bankers join the board of a firm, the firm displays less investment-cash flow sensitivity and obtains larger loans. The effect depends on affiliation, i.e., directors whose banks have a lending relationship with the firm. Moreover, lending increases only for firms that are least financially constrained, such as firms with investment-grade debt. These firms also appear to have worse investment opportunities and lower profitability. Constrained firms receive no such assistance. Thus, the additional lending appears to benefit creditors rather than shareholders. We find no measurable impact of other, unconflicted financial experts.
Second, we consider external investment (i.e. mergers and acquisitions) and financing with public securities. Here, we focus on investment bankers. We find that firms with investment bankers on their boards undertake worse acquisitions. In the 5 days around takeover bids, they lose 1% more than firms without investment banker directors.
They also lose significantly more value over the three years following an acquisition.
Firms with investment bankers on their board are also associated with larger bond issues, in particular if the director's bank is involved in the deal. And, while investment bankers on the board generally seem to reduce underwriting fees, this helping hand is not visible when their own bank is involved in the deal. Thus, like commercial bankers, investment bankers have a significant impact on corporate decisions, but not necessarily in the inter-3 est of shareholders. Again there is little evidence that non-conflicted financial experts improve firm policies (or have any impact at all).
Third, we test for the influence of financial experts on decisions where their outside incentives are not in conflict with the interests of shareholders, such as CEO compensation. 6 We find little evidence that financial experts affect decisions without clear consequences for their home institutions.
Our results challenge the view that more financial expertise on corporate boards unambiguously improves firm policy. Rather, the benefits have to be weighted against the costs due to misaligned incentives. Experts are associated with policies that may create value for their financial institutions, but we find little evidence of benefits to shareholders. Our findings do not imply that financial experts destroy shareholder value on net.
Companies may benefit from financial expertise on their board through several other avenues. Aggrawal and Chadha (2003) , for example, find that having directors with a CPA, CFA, or similar degree on audit committees translates into fewer earnings restatements. DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) document a positive stock market reaction to the appointment of directors with accounting knowledge to the audit committee (though not to the appointment of other financial experts). Moreover, our data consists of large, mature US firms; small early-stage firms, for example, may benefit from the financial expertise of venture capitalists (Hellman and Puri (2000, 2002) , Kortum and Lerner (2000) ).
A key concern for any analysis of director effects is the endogeneity of board composition, a point made both theoretically and empirically by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998 and 1988) , among others. 7 In particular, the causality may be reverse, and firms' financing needs may determine the board representation of financial institutions. 8 Our detailed data allows us to better address these concerns for several reasons.
First, the fourteen-year time series provides sufficient variation in board composition to identify commercial banker effects even after controlling for company fixed effects. Thus, the estimated effect does not reflect time-invariant firm characteristics. 6 For a discussion of the role of directors in setting compensation and of financial expertise (e.g. in understanding the value of option grants which are not expensed) see Holmström and Kaplan (2003) . 7 For an extensive review of the literature see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) . 8 Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) , Pfeffer (1992) , and Booth and Deli (1999) interpret the correlation between firm leverage and board presence of bankers as evidence of firms hiring financial directors for their debt market expertise.
Second, we are able to instrument for the board presence of commercial bankers, using pre-sample shocks to the supply of banker directors. were less likely to be filled with commercial bankers than in other decades, while the overall rate of board appointments remained the same. We instrument for the number of commercial bankers on the board with the number of current directors hired during the crisis period. All results replicate. A placebo instrument, the number of directors appointed between 1966 and 1975, fails to replicate the results, corroborating our analysis.
Finally, we can identify and remove company-year observations in which selection concerns are most severe, such as years with major acquisitions and the first years of a banker's tenure. We show that such years do not drive our results.
For other financial experts, we cannot use fixed effects in most cases. There is, for example, insufficient within-firm variation in acquisitions. We also do not have an instrumental variable strategy. As in previous literature, we rely on cross-sectional identification and must be cautious about the interpretation of the findings. The endogeneity concerns are ameliorated by the discrepancy between high-frequency corporate decisions and low-frequency board turnover. (Average director tenure is nine years.) Costs of termination and search costs make it impractical to adjust board composition for every policy. Thus, even if a director is chosen to implement a specific policy, firms must consider many policy dimensions. For example, a director hired for her debt market expertise will also influence executive compensation and acquisition policies. But, her impact on the latter decisions may conflict with the preferences of the CEO or the shareholders.
Our analysis complements a growing literature relating board characteristics to firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani (2006) ; Perry and Peyer (2005)) and extends the analysis to specific corporate policies. Our paper relates most closely to Kroszner and Strahan (2001a and b) , who also study conflicts of interest when commercial bankers sit on corporate boards. They find that banker directors are less common in smaller, more volatile firms, where conflicts are most severe, and in distressed firms, where legal constraints, such as equitable subordination, deter bankers. Our results indicate that conflicts of interests still matter in large, stable firms. Consistent with this interpretation, Kracaw 5 and Zenner (1998) find a negative stock price reaction to bank loans if an affiliate of the lending bank sits on the board of the borrower. Morck and Nakamura (1999) show that banker directors emphasize policies that favor creditors over shareholders in a dataset on Japanese bank ties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data (Section I). In Section II, we investigate the effect of financial expertise on internal investment and financing policies. In Section III, we study acquisition and public issuance decisions. In Section IV, we evaluate the impact of financial expertise on policies which preclude conflicts of interests. In Section V, we conclude.
I. Data
We analyze a sample of publicly traded companies from 1988 to 2001. 9 We build on the dataset of Hall and Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995) , merged with CEO demographics from Malmendier and Tate (2005) . To be included in the original Hall-Liebman sample, a firm has to appear at least four times on one of the lists of largest US companies published by Forbes magazine from 1984 to 1994. We exclude financial firms.
We hand-collect biographical information on all board members of these companies using annual proxy statements (1988−1997) and the IRRC database (1998−2001) .
We code each outside director's main employment into one of the following categories 10 :
(1) commercial bank executive, (2) investment bank executive, (3) executive of a nonbank financial institution, (4) finance executive (CFO, Accountant, Treasurer, or Vice President for Finance), (5) "finance" professor (including finance, economics, accounting, and business), (6) consultant, (7) lawyer, (8) executive of a non-financial firm that falls outside these categories, and (9) non-corporate worker (including careers in academia, nonprofit or civil activist organizations, and politics).
We take additional steps to refine the first two categories, which play a key role in the analysis. First, if the description of a bankers's employer is vague or missing, we identify the bank from the FDIC list of US chartered commercial banks and the 9 Our sample period excludes SOX-induced changes. While it would be interesting to evaluate the impact of SOX in an extended data set, such an analysis remains currently infeasible since our estimations would require multiple post-SOX observations (after the extended compliance deadlines in 2005). The homogeneity of pre-SOX data allows us to exploit the full time series for the estimation of financial-expert effects. 10 The employee falls into more than one category in a few cases, such as banks that are both (1) and (2).
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Carter−Manaster IPO underwriter reputation rankings updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004) . To be considered a banker, the director has to be an executive of the bank, not just a board member. The exception is when the director retains a seat on the bank's board upon retiring from an executive position. Retired bankers who do not retain a seat on the bank's board, instead, are reclassified in category (8) since they should no longer be affected by misaligned incentives. 11 We do the same for retired executives of nonbank financial institutions. To the extent that the reclassification into the non-banker sample is an "over-adjustment", the resulting measurement error works against finding significant effects in our regression analysis. We classify retired directors of categories (4) to (9) into the category most in line with their pre-retirement work history.
The data collection yields 32,943 observations. The summary statistics are in Table 1, Panel A. Insiders, i.e. current or former employees of the firm or relatives of executives, make up 27% of director years. Outsiders from non-financial industries account for 44% and directors in non-corporate careers for 10%. Financial experts account for 18%, with executives of non-bank financial firms the most common (8%) and accountants the least (0.5%). Directors are on average 60 years old, have served on the board for 9 years, and hold two other directorships. Women account for only 8.5% of director years.
We transform the sample into firm-years in Panel B. 27% and 16% of the firmyears, respectively, have a director from a commercial or an investment bank. We denote a commercial banker as affiliated if her bank has lent to the firm in the past, as reported in the Dealscan database. 22% of the commercial banker-years involve an affiliated banker. Financial executives and accountants are present in almost half of firm years (46%) and academics with a financial economics background in 18%. 56% of firm years contain a director who is an executive of a non-bank financial company.
We supplement the director data with accounting and financial information from We also split the sample into firms with and without financial experts on their board, separately for each type of expert. 15 Comparing the subsamples with and without commercial bankers, we find that firms with commercial bankers on their board are larger (in terms of assets), though not significantly so. They also appear to generate more cash 12 We use the standard definition of cash flow in the investment-cash flow literature (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, Peterson (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ). The capital-structure literature, instead, accounts for changes in working capital, though in a different context: in order to calculate the required amount of external financing, cash flow (defined similarly) is subtracted from the sum of changes in working capital, investment, and dividends. (See, e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2003 The sample differences reveal non-random sorting of finance experts, though not always according to the traditional sorting story (i.e. into more profitable and less constrained firms). The endogeneity underscores the importance of a panel analysis, including fixed effects and, where possible, instrumenting for the board presence of experts.
We supplement our sample with data from CRSP (monthly stock returns), Execucomp (CEO compensation), I/B/E/S (analyst coverage), SDC (public debt and equity issues, and acquisitions), and the Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan (bank loans).
II. Internal Investment and Loan Financing
The core question of this paper is whether board members with financial expertise affect corporate policies and, if so, whether affiliation distorts their impact.
A. Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow
We begin our analysis by investigating the impact of finance experts on internal investment and financing decisions. We estimate the standard model of internal investment: The model determines investment as a function of firm and board characteristics. CF is 9 cash flow, FIN the set of dummies for finance experts, Q Tobin's Q, and X an array of other controls, including the natural logarithms of firm and board size, the fraction of outside directors and fixed effects for year, S&P long term debt rating, and firm or industry.
Industries are the Fama and French 48 industry groups. We test for the significance of β 3 .
To correct for heteroskedasticity and correlation of errors within firms, we cluster standard errors at the firm level. 16 This adjustment makes a substantial difference given the slow evolution of board composition and autocorrelation in capital expenditures.
Column I of Table 2 presents the baseline regression without banker indicators.
As in prior studies, both cash flow and Q positively predict investment. The ratio of outside directors is negatively related to investment. Column II includes the dummies for financial experts. The cash-flow, Q, and board-independence coefficients vary little, and none of the financial-expert dummies are significant. The interaction of commercial banker and cash flow, however, has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is also economically significant: baseline investment-cash flow sensitivity, evaluated at the mean of the continuous explanatory variables, with all expertise variables at 0, and for the baseline year (1988), industry (agriculture), and S&P credit rating (none), is $0.36. Adding a commercial banker to the board decreases this sensitivity by 32%, or $0.12. For other finance experts, the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are insignificant and much smaller in magnitude. All results are robust to variations in the financial-expert variables such as using fractions or counts instead of dummies.
Thus, the presence of commercial bankers is associated with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, but none of the other types of financial experts appear to matter.
The main difficulty in interpreting these findings is unobserved firm heterogeneity. One interpretation is that commercial bankers induce lower investment-cash flow
sensitivity. An alternative interpretation is that firms with low investment-cash flow sensitivity seek bankers as directors. Or, bankers may decline directorships in firms that are investment-cash flow sensitive. The latter is particularly plausible if firms with higher investment-cash flow sensitivity are in financial distress. In these firms, the legal principles of equitable subordination and lender liability may deter a lending bank from board representation since involvement in active management impairs the bank's claims in case of 16 We cluster standard errors throughout the paper, even where it is not explicitly noted in the text.
bankruptcy (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001a) .
17
The latter selection concern is mitigated in our data since the legal constraints apply only in the case of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is unlikely for our sample firms as, for example, indicated by the 2.05 average z-score (and 1.93 median). 18 Moreover, the average z-score is even higher in firms without commercial bankers (2.14) than in those with commercial bankers (1.81). Nevertheless, the broader selection concern remains, and we take several steps to address it.
First, we exploit within-firm variation in the board presence of bankers. In 55 cases, the COMBANKER dummy variable changes from 0 to 1, and in 93 cases from 1 to 0. The value of COMBANKER shows time-series variation in 104 out of 282 firms. In
Column III, we add firm fixed effects, and in Column IV we also include (firm)*(cash flow) interactions. The decrease in cash flow sensitivity among larger firms now becomes significant. The negative effect of COMBANKER on cash flow sensitivity is diminished in magnitude and precision though still significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
As we will see in Section II.B, the reduced effect is due to constrained firms in which commercial bankers do little to influence firm policy. The positive effect of COM-BANKER on investment also becomes significant. The positive level effect combines with the negative sensitivity to produce an overall increase of 2.5% (Column III) and 5%
(Column IV) from the mean of capital-scaled investment.
The robustness of our findings to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects leaves two possible interpretations. Either commercial bankers on the board reduce the sensitivity of investment to internal funds, or the results reflect time-varying firm characteristics. Firms may ask bankers to join boards precisely when they are seeking external financing and to depart when scaling back investment. And bankers may agree to join boards only if (and as long as) they foresee a profitable financing opportunity.
Before we address this alternative explanation directly, we note that the low degree of variation in board size (within firms) undermines its plausibility. Investment and financing vary a lot within firms, but board size remains constant, from one year to the next, in 45% of all firm-years. The median change in board size from year to year is 0; the mean change is -0.102 (with a standard deviation of 1.296). Figure 1 shows that mean and median board size are, if anything, decreasing over our sample period. Moreover, director tenure is long, with a mean of nine years. Thus, the turnover of directors appears too low and "out of sync" with high-frequency corporate decisions to represent task-or policy-specific entry and exit. If directors are hired to implement specific policy changes, then most of their time on the board is likely to occur after those policies are in effect.
Nevertheless, we address this concern in several ways. If directors are hired to help implement a specific firm policy, their impact should be mainly felt in their first one or two years on the board. Thus, as a first robustness check, we recode the COM-BANKER dummy as 0 in those years. Replicating The validity of the instrument relies on the implicit assumption that board turnover between 1976 and 1985 is not different from other periods. If firms hired at a higher or lower rate during the crisis period, then the same shock that precipitated board restructuring might also explain changes in investment. We find, however, that the year-by-year distribution of directors' tenure is stable. In every single year, the median is 7 years. In addition, the 25 th and 10 th percentiles of the tenure distribution are identical in all sample years, and the 75 th and 90 th percentile vary at most by one year in either direction.
Another potential concern about the instrument is that it may capture variation in director tenure across firms. For example, well-run firms may have low board turnover, resulting in both low values of the instrument and low investment-cash flow sensitivity.
We address this concern directly by including mean board tenure and its interaction with cash flow in our regressions. 20 We also account for industry-specific patterns in board restructuring and investment-cash flow sensitivity by including dummies for the 48 FamaFrench industry groups and their interactions with cash flow. These controls address, for example, responses to industry-specific takeover pressure. 21 Since our instrument mainly exploits variation in board appointments across firms, there is insufficient within-firm variation to include firm fixed effects.
It is important to acknowledge remaining concerns about excludability of the in-20 Another way to address concerns that the CRISIS variable captures firms that are poorly run is to add additional controls for firm governance and its interaction with cash flow. We re-estimate our regressions including the number of outsiders on the board as an additional control and find little impact on the results. We have also added age and its interaction with cash flow since the definition of CRISIS places restrictions on directors' age. The results are unaffected. Finally, the results are robust to interacting the tenure variable with age and, in turn, with cash flow. This addresses the argument that not only long tenure, but also being young and active affects director effectiveness (and might be captured by the CRISIS variable). Another concern might be that the tenure control variable is skewed given the slow rate of board turnover. We find, however, that mean board tenure exhibits little skewness in the data, with a mean of 9.82, a median of 9.25, and a standard deviation of 3.91. Moreover, the results of the regression in Table 4 become slightly stronger when using median tenure (and age) and are robust to including quadratic terms in median tenure and age and their interactions with cash flow. 21 We also address the concern about takeover pressure directly and re-estimate the model starting in 1990 (after the takeover pressure largely subsided). We find again similar results.
13 strument from the investment regression. Ideally, firms would be differently affected by the banking crisis only through the channel of director selection. The banking crisis does not provide such a clean experiment. Director appointments between 1976 and 1985, however, are unlikely to affect investment during our later 1988-2001 sample period.
In Table 3 As a placebo test, we repeat the two-stage least-squares regressions using direc- 22 We use the number of bankers (rather than the dummy) in the instrument regressions, since a binary endogenous variable would induce non-classical measurement error.
14 tors appointed between 1966 and 1975 in lieu of the instrument. Since this era pre-dated the commercial banking crisis, the results should not replicate. Indeed, we find that both the first and second stages fail. This uniqueness strengthens the argument that the CRISIS variables matter because of the proposed banking crisis channel and enhances the validity of our instrument. Moreover, the placebo instrument provides direct evidence that CRI-SIS does not simply capture the effect of "stable and long-lasting directorship."
We conclude that commercial bankers significantly reduce companies' sensitivity of investment to internal resources. We detect no such impact for other financial experts.
B. Is Less Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity More Efficient?
We now ask whether the impact of bankers on investment benefits shareholders. We also explore the channel of the bankers' influence. (2003)). Bankers may back inefficient but low-risk projects to benefit their own banks, possibly against the interest of shareholders.
Financing Constraints
To test these hypotheses, we first examine financial constraints. If the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity is the result of better access to external financing and less underinvestment, it should be most prominent when firms are financially constrained.
There is little consensus on the best way to measure financial constraints. We employ several different proxies, proposed in previous literature. First, we construct the Kaplan-Zingles (KZ) index for our sample, following standard practice (Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo, 2001; Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005 
where CF is cash flow, K capital, Q Tobin's Q, and C cash and short-term investments.
Higher KZ values indicate greater financial constraint. We use the sample median of the lagged KZ index to split firm years into constrained and unconstrained subsamples.
The KZ index is not without shortcomings. In particular, it assumes that the index weights generalize beyond the original sample of manufacturing firms. Using the index to split the sample, rather than as a continuous measure, mitigates concerns about measurement error. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of our results, we consider three alternative proxies. 24 First, we use investment-grade long term debt ratings (BBB and above)
as an indicator of smooth access to external capital. 25 Second, we use the number of analysts following the stock. Third, we use the degree of disagreement among analysts, measured by the standard deviation of quarterly earnings estimates in the quarter ending before the annual proxy meeting. The last two proxies address the concern that the KZ index and (indirectly) bond ratings may indicate financial distress rather than constraints.
Analyst-based proxies more directly capture informational asymmetries as a source of external finance constraints. 26 The alternative proxies lead to largely similar (and sometimes stronger) results. 27 For brevity, we report only the estimates using the KZ index.
Before turning to the split-sample regressions, we compare the subsamples of 23 Using model-generated data, Moyen (2004) shows that firms with low dividends -considered to be more financially constrained in several studies -are in fact more likely to be unconstrained. 24 An extensive list of classification schemes can be found in Hubbard's (1998) "constrained" and "unconstrained" is not to be confused with "financially troubled" and "financially healthy." Both z-scores are significantly different, at the 1% level, from 1.
Thus, bankruptcy considerations are unlikely to have bite in either subsample.
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The summary statistics also speak to the concern that bankers select into unconstrained firms. Commercial bankers are present on the board in 30% of the constrained subsample and 26% of the unconstrained sample. There are no significant differences in the presence of any type of financial expert among the two subsamples of constrained and unconstrained firms. This result may reflect the frequency with which firms move between subsamples while bankers appointed to the board remain directors: Out of the 282 firms, 132 make at least one switch from "constrained" to "unconstrained" or vice versa. Table 4 presents the split-sample regressions. In Columns I and II, we replicate the most stringent specification of Table 2 (Column IV, including firm effects and firmcash flow interactions) for both subsamples. Note that, in this specification, we cannot easily interpret the coefficient of cash flow. It depends on which firm dummy we omit from the regression, and it captures only the sensitivity of that one firm. We find that bankers significantly reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash flow when firms are unconstrained rather than when they are constrained. Also, the positive level effect of COMBANKER is present only in the unconstrained subsample. As before, none of the other financial experts exert a significant level or interaction effect.
These results cast doubt on the hypothesis that bankers help to solve information problems between firms and capital markets. In the subset of firms most likely to be affected by informational asymmetries, commercial bankers do not exert significant influence on investment and financing. They only matter in unconstrained firms.
The value consequences of reduced investment-cash flow sensitivity in unconstrained firms, however, remain ambiguous. Commercial bankers may prevent the abuse of funds when cash flow is high. Or, they may provide additional funds to empirebuilding managers when free cash flow is low. In the next subsection, we analyze lending and lending affiliation to disentangle the different interpretations.
Lending and Lending Affiliation
We start the analysis of bank lending by testing whether banker directors (efficiently)
provide additional loans to constrained firms, which the investment model fails to capture. We also test whether bankers on the board provide additional lending to unconstrained firms. Increased lending to unconstrained firms would suggest that commercial bankers reduce sensitivity of investment to cash flow by providing funds when cash flow is low rather than by restricting (over-)investment when cash flow is high. Finally, we test whether the reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity among unconstrained firms is due to affiliated bankers, whose banks originate loans to the firm. A positive result would directly confirm the importance of the lending mechanism.
We use the Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database to obtain detailed information on loan terms and lenders (see Güner (2006)). Table 5 summarizes the data.
We consider a banker-director affiliated if her bank is a member of the lending syndicate. (Here, both differences are significant with p-values of 0.03 and 0.05, respectively).
To isolate the banker effect, we regress loan size on the presence of bankers, controlling for an array of firm, board, and deal characteristics. The firm and board controls are the logarithm of firm total assets; Tobin's Q; plant, property, and equipment over assets; stock volatility; leverage; log board size; and the ratio of independent directors on the board. The contract controls are designed to capture borrower risk, which in turn affects loan pricing. As in previous literature 30 , we use the logarithm of the days between contract initiation and maturity, a dummy for origination by a syndicate rather than a sole lender, number of lenders in the syndicate, and indicators for seniority and security of the loan. (See the Appendix for more details on these variables.) We also include fixed effects for S&P credit ratings, year, and industry or firm. As in our analysis of investment, we check whether additional lending is directed towards financially constrained or unconstrained firms, using the overall sample median of the KZ index to split the sample. The results are in Columns III-VI of Table 6 . We find that the loan increase is largely driven by unconstrained firms. In the model with industry fixed effects and the unconstrained subsample, affiliated loans are on average $911m larger (p-value = 0.03) than unaffiliated loans. The coefficient estimate on Unaffiliated COMBANKER is instead $500m (p-value = 0.18). The difference is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.12). The affiliated banker effect in the constrained sample, however, is significantly smaller: the p-value of the difference in affiliated lending in constrained and unconstrained firms ($213m versus $911m) is 0.09. With firm fixed effects (Columns V and VI), the results are similar. Only the difference between affiliated and unaffiliated bankers in unconstrained firms is less pronounced.
31
Overall, we consistently find significantly larger bank loans when commercial bankers are present on the board. The estimated effect is larger for affiliated than for unaffiliated deals, though the difference is statistically insignificant. However, the estimated effect of affiliated bankers is significantly stronger in unconstrained firms than in constrained firms. These findings mirror our investment cash flow sensitivity results. Together, the results are hard to reconcile with the hypotheses that bankers on the board ease inefficient financing constraints or provide superior monitoring (i.e. curb wasteful investment when free cash flow is high), at least on average. They are, however, consistent with the hypothesis that bankers lend in the best interest of the bank.
We corroborate these results by merging the information about banker affiliation from the loan data with our earlier firm-year sample to test for the effect of affiliation in the investment-cash flow framework. We classify a commercial banker director as "affiliated" if her bank has lent to the firm in the past, including participation in a syndicate. 32 In Columns III and IV of Table 4 , we re-estimate the split sample results of Col-31 Notably, the investment banker effect also becomes significant in the fixed effects regressions. 32 We also designed two alternative classification schemes to check whether, instead of capturing the impact of a banker-director, the estimated effect is due to a pre-existing bank-firm relationship. First, we create a third category of "grey" commercial bankers who join a firm with a pre-existing lending relationship with their bank. Isolating them does not change the estimated impact of (the remaining) affiliated bankers. Second, we drop firm years that contain banker-directors who we cannot classify due to the censoring of Dealscan before 1988. Our initial scheme classifies bankers who are already on the board in 1988 as unaffiliated (until the first affiliated loan), to bias against an affiliation result. The results are, again, similar.
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umns I and II with separate dummies for affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers.
This specification includes firm effects and the interactions of firm effects with cash flow. In the constrained subsample, the coefficients on both banker cash flow interactions (affiliated and unaffiliated) are positive, though insignificant. In the unconstrained subsample, instead, both coefficients are negative and significant. The affiliated banker interaction (-0.378), however, is significantly larger than the unaffiliated banker interaction (-0.081). The difference is significant with a p-value of 0.05. Thus, even though the direct effect of affiliation on lending is not conclusive, the reduction in cash flow sensitivity depends on a lending relationship with the director's bank.
Investment Opportunities, Earnings and Capital Structure
To gain additional insights into the value implications of increased lending, we examine whether firms that receive extra funding from banker directors have profitable investment opportunities. We also ask whether the extra lending provides benefits to shareholders that valuation ratios fail to capture, such as an improved capital structure.
In an ideal empirical analysis, we would evaluate whether the marginal project financed with a director-banker's loan creates or destroys value. Two data limitations hamper such an analysis. First, we cannot link loans to specific projects. Second, we cannot link specific projects to their marginal returns. Thus, we are limited to considering the joint effect of lending on all ongoing projects and the resulting overall performance.
Thus, even when the marginal contribution of a loan-financed project is negative, we might find a positive mean performance. In the context of external investment, i.e. acquisitions (see Section III.A), we will be able to separate these effects since we can identify the timing and return implications of distinct acquisitions.
In the context of internal investment, we partially remedy these limitations using industry performance as the hypothetical counterfactual (i.e., the returns to investment without the additional lending and resulting additional investment). Firm by firm and year by year, we subtract the median industry value from the performance measure. We use four measures: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin's Q, and
Altman's z-score. We use the 48 Fama and French industry groups unless there are less 21 than five sample firms in an industry. 33 We consider a seven-year window around loans (year -3 to year +3, with year 0 indicating the year of borrowing) and calculate the mean industry-adjusted value of each performance measure, separately for each group of borrowers, in each year. 34 We also evaluate the performance of firms with affiliated loans relative to borrowers with no or only unaffiliated bankers on their boards.
The left column of Figure 2 displays the performance of unconstrained firms.
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Starting with accounting performance, we find that firms with affiliated loans perform equal to or insignificantly worse than the industry benchmark in each year prior to lending and significantly worse post lending, in years 1 and 2 for ROA and years 1 and 3 for ROE. Firms with bank loans but unaffiliated bankers, instead, outperform their industries in every year prior to and post lending, significantly so in most years. The performance of firms without bankers on their boards is indistinguishable from the industry benchmark.
These results suggest that additional lending through affiliated bankers is not justified by better ongoing or subsequent earnings. Affiliated borrowers perform persistently worse than industry peers or unaffiliated borrowers.
In addition, the trend in accounting returns post-lending is worse for affiliated borrowers. The difference in industry-adjusted ROA between affiliated-banker and nobanker borrowing firms is insignificant in all years prior to the loan and in the year of the loan, ameliorating concerns about firm heterogeneity prior to lending. In the year after the loan, instead, the difference is marginally significant (p=0.09). The effect tails off in years 2 and 3 (p=0.11 and p=0.26). Thus the year after the loan marks a unique change in relative performance. ROE displays a similar trend: The magnitude of the difference is at its minimum in year -2 (0.003), increases to its maximum in year 0 (0.097), and remains steady at roughly 0.06 thereafter.
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We also find a decline in performance from the year prior to the loan to the year after the loan among affiliated borrowers. Industry adjusted ROA declines by 0.017 (p = 0.07) and ROE by 0.032 (p = 0.05). Over longer horizons (year -1 to year +2 or year +3), 33 If there are fewer than five sample firms in an industry category, the Fama-French 17 group is used. If there are fewer than five sample firms in any of these groups, the Fama-French 12 group is used. 34 We confirmed the robustness of our results to using medians. 35 Tables of the means and of all differences-in-means tests are available from the authors. 36 In this case, the estimates are more precise: the difference between firms with affiliated bankers and no bankers is statistically significant in all but year -2.
22 the slopes remain negative, though the statistical significance diminishes (only ROE over -1 to +3 is marginally significant).
Turning to the next measure, Tobin's Q, we find that the market perceives firms with affiliated loans to have the worst investment opportunities throughout the seven-year window. In each year, unaffiliated borrowers and borrowers without bankers outperform their industries, while affiliated bankers underperform. The differences between affiliated-banker and no-banker firms are statistically significant and strongest in the years leading up to the lending decisions, at the 1% or 5% level in year -3 to year 0, suggesting worse investment opportunities prior to the loan. The difference between affiliated and unaffiliated loans is marginally significant in year -2 and has p-values ranging from 0.1 to 0.14 in the other three years prior to (and including) the loan year.
Finally, firms with affiliated loans have persistently lower z-scores than the industry norm and than each of the other subgroups of borrowers, though the differences are small and insignificant in most years.
The right column of Figure 2 shows that the performance of constrained firms does not differ across types of lending for any of the four performance measures.
Thus, among financially unconstrained firms the additional bank loans to affiliated borrowers neither reflect superior investment opportunities prior to the loan nor appear to generate higher earnings after the loan. Firms that obtain bank loans from their directors' banks are significantly worse performers and have worse investment opportunities, both compared to the industry and to other borrowers. We must, however, be cautious in interpreting the results, given the measurement issues outlined above.
As a final step, we ask whether affiliated lending provides benefits to shareholders that the valuation ratios fail to capture. In particular, lending might move a firm's capital structure closer to an optimal level. Graham (2000) finds, for example, that firms tend to use debt too conservatively relative to its tax benefits. The pattern is particularly true of large, liquid, and profitable firms with low distress costs, i.e., precisely the type of firm in our unconstrained subsample. This interpretation would require the additional loans to affect leverage rather than, e.g., substituting for other types of debt.
We test for significant and persistent increases in firm leverage following (affiliated) loans to unconstrained firms. We use the definitions of book and market leverage from Section I and also check the robustness of the results to using the following alternative definitions: the difference in assets and book equity divided by assets for book leverage and divided by assets minus book equity plus market equity for market leverage. We regress the post-borrowing change in leverage on the banker dummies and controls for the change in the ratio of plant, property and equipment over total assets; change in Tobin's Q; change in the natural logarithm of sales; change in ROA; and the natural log of board size. We also include year and the Fama-French 17 industry dummies. 37 We find that affiliated bankers lead to a significantly larger increase in book leverage (using either measure) from the end of the fiscal year prior to borrowing to the end of the first full fiscal year after borrowing than non-banker directors. The difference between unaffiliated and affiliated bankers, however, is not statistically significant and disappears by the end of the third year following the loan. Moreover, there are few significant estimates if we consider market rather than book leverage. Finally, the results are not robust to minor changes in variable definitions; e.g., the treatment of directors whose bank had a lending relationship with the firm prior to their appointment to the board.
In summary, there is little evidence that the larger loans provided by affiliated bankers carry through to leverage. Even the effect on book leverage appears to be shortlived and not part of a systematic strategy to raise leverage.
In light of these results and the performance results one might wonder whether the extra lending is actually in the interests of creditors. If extra lending induces firms to undertake value-destroying projects, it might also increase the likelihood of default. Figure   2 reveals that, even post-borrowing, the mean z-score among affiliated borrowers never drops below 1.5. In unreported estimations, we confirm that affiliated lending does not increase default probability relative to unaffiliated lending or lending when banker directors are not present, as measured by changes in S&P credit ratings or distance to default.
The findings overall suggest that bank executives use their directorships to increase lending, but mainly to firms with low financial constraints and credit risk, coupled with poor internal investment opportunities. On average, they appear more likely to facilitate overinvestment than to correct inefficient underinvestment. 37 The results are also robust to including credit rating dummies, as elsewhere in the paper.
III. External Investment and Public Debt Financing
Turning from internal to external investment decisions, we ask whether directors with financial expertise affect mergers and acquisitions, especially since major acquisitions require board approval. The type of financial experts most likely to affect acquisition decisions are investment bankers. Investment bankers are also most likely to be involved in public securities issues. Both as underwriters and (potential) advisors to acquisitions, they face incentive conflicts similar to those facing commercial lenders: they are charged both with maximizing bank profits and shareholder value.
A. Acquisitions
First, we ask whether directors with financial expertise help to prevent value-destroying acquisitions. By analyzing abnormal returns to merger bids, we can assess directly the impact of expertise on shareholder value. We use SDC data on completed mergers in which the acquirer obtains more than 50% of the target shares and with a deal value of more than $5m. Similar to previous literature (e.g. Baker and Savasoglu, 2002), we exclude leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, self-tenders, acquisitions of subsidiaries, spinoffs, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, privatizations, and acquisitions of remaining interests.
The summary statistics are in Panel A of Table 7 . About 30% of the target firms are publicly traded, compared to less than 7% in the raw SDC data. The average target value is $214m, 7% of the acquirer's total assets. In 16% of the acquiring companies, investment bankers sit on the board; in 26% commercial bankers. Panel A also shows the differences between acquiring firms with and without investment bankers on the board.
(and p-values from t-tests, with clustering at the industry level). Targets acquired by
firms with investment-banker directors are significantly more likely to be public and are larger, both in absolute dollar terms and as a percentage of the acquirer's size. The presence of commercial bankers and executives of non-bank financial institutions do not vary significantly, but firms with investment bankers are less likely to have outside finance executives and accountants or to have finance professors on their board. In untabulated probit regressions, we also find that, controlling for an array of firm characteristics and fixed effects (Fama-French 48 industries, year, and credit rating), firms with investment bankers on the board acquire at roughly the same frequency as other firms.
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As a first step towards assessing the value implications of mergers with and without investment-banker directors, we analyze the announcement effects. We compute cumulative abnormal returns over a five-day window around the announcement date as the sum of the daily difference between raw returns and the CRSP value-weighted index returns. 38 The mean CAR is -1.33% (p = 0.04) in firms with investment bankers and -0.32% (p = 0.25) in firms without. The difference has a p-value of 0.11. The difference in medians is identical, 1.01 percentage points. The 1.33% decline in the investment banker subsample is three times as large as the average CAR in the overall sample.
In Panel B, we move to a regression framework. We relate cumulative abnormal returns to the presence of each type of finance expert on the board, controlling for board size, board independence as well as year, industry and credit-rating fixed effects. The results confirm the pattern in the means. The estimated impact of investment bankers is -1 ppt, marginally significant at the 10% level. The result loses significance after introducing more merger-specific controls -dummies for the type of financing and whether the acquisition is diversifying -but the size of the estimated effect remains the same (-1 ppt).
We also find that the effect is driven by private targets. For the subsample of private targets, the size of the investment-banker effect doubles and becomes significant at the 5% level. For public targets, there is no effect. These differences may reflect the more subjective valuation of private targets. The value consequences of mergers with private targets are less obvious, making it easier for management or investment bankers to direct the board and shareholders towards approval of value-destroying mergers.
We also estimate a significantly positive effect of 0.8 ppt for non-bank finance executives in the full sample. And, financial executives and accountants have a positive effect (1 ppt) in the sample of private targets. This result is consistent with a positive governance role for financial executives and accountants, who are often identified as ideal di-
rectors (Stuart 2005).
We then examine whether the underperformance of mergers in firms with investment-banker directors reverts over longer horizons. We analyze buy-and-hold returns over +/-36 months around each acquisition, compounded monthly over the relevant in- 38 We use α = 0 and β = 1 since the market beta is likely close to 1 for our sample firms and because of the short window. The assumption eliminates biases in the returns estimation due to noise in the joint estimation of alphas and betas. However, the market-model results with estimated alphas and betas are similar.
terval. In Figure 3 , we display the buy-and-hold returns from month 0 to month x up to x = 36. And, for months -36 to 0, we display the buy-and-hold returns from month -x to 0, downward shifted so that the cumulative return as of month 0 is 0.
The left graph in Figure 3 shows monthly raw returns, compounded for each merger event and then averaged in the subsamples with and without investment bankers.
Acquirers without investment bankers display similar or better performance in the three years prior to the merger and their performance trend continues smoothly post merger.
Acquirers with investment bankers, instead, perform worse post merger, both relative to their own prior performance and relative to acquirers without investment-banker directors. The difference in abnormal returns is even more striking. In the right panel, we subtract market returns (CRSP value-weighted index) off the monthly raw returns before compounding. Firms without investment bankers again display a smooth trend of performance both prior to and post merger. Firms with investment bankers, instead, revert from positive to negative abnormal returns after the merger. We find the same results using alternative models of abnormal returns (e.g., subtracting full-sample industry-mean returns or industry-mean returns and the firm-specific pre-event average difference between firm and industry-mean returns). We also confirm in a regression framework, including firm and merger characteristics, that the negative announcement returns are not reversed over longer horizons.
As in any long-run event study, our results may be explained by the event or by the (mis-)specification of expected returns. This concern is ameliorated in our context since we observe the same pattern -a kink at the merger month for firms with investment bankers, but none for firms without -using several different expected return assumptions and in the raw returns, i.e. without any (potentially biased) expected return adjustment.
We conclude that investment bank directors are associated with worse investments in outside targets.
B. Size and Cost of Public Debt Issues
Mirroring our analysis of internal investment, we turn from acquisitions to financing choices. Given investment bankers' expertise, we focus on public debt issues.
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We obtain contractual data on public debt issues from SDC. The summary statis- 39 We also analyzed equity issues, but, given the small sample, did not find significant results.
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tics are in The difference in the spread relative to affiliated issues is significant at the 1%-level.
In Table 9 , we test whether the board presence of financial experts affects the size and pricing of debt issues, controlling for the full set of firm and board characteristics as well as for borrower and deal characteristics from the previous empirical literature. 40 In Columns I and II, we document the size results. The presence of an investment banker is associated with a $20.1m larger deal, marginally significant at the 10% level.
The magnitude is economically significant: it is equal to 19% of the average principal in the sample. As in our analysis of bank lending, the estimates are larger for affiliated than for unaffiliated deals, but the difference lacks statistical significance (p = 0.16): the coefficient estimate on Affiliated IBANKER is $64.8m (p = 0.09), compared with only $4.7m
(p = 0.72) for Unaffiliated IBANKER. 41 In unreported estimations, we also find that investment bankers are associated with more frequent outside financing. Thus, as in the commercial banker setting, the larger issues are associated with more capital inside the firm, though the effects are not estimated precisely.
In Column III, we analyze the pricing of public debt. We observe an insignificant and small negative effect of affiliated investment bankers on gross spread and a significantly negative effect of much larger magnitude for unaffiliated investment bankers. The coefficient estimate is −0.063 (p = 0.02, different from the affiliated coefficient at the 10% level), which corresponds roughly to 11% of the sample mean of gross spread. Thus, firms with investment bankers on the board enjoy reduced costs of public borrowing, but only when the director's bank is not involved in the deal.
Overall, the impact of investment bankers on public debt issues mirrors that of 40 E.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999) . See the Appendix for further details on these variables. 41 The result is robust to scaling debt size by total market value. The size and price results are not robust to including firm effects.
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commercial bankers on loans, though the effects are estimated less precisely. Investment bankers are associated with larger issues, especially if their bank is an underwriter. They are able to lower underwriting fees -possibly due to their negotiation skills and industry networks -but do so only when it does not affect deals of their own banks.
IV. Financial Expertise in the Absence of Conflicts of Interests
Our analysis has shown that financial experts affect corporate decisions from which their financial institutions can benefit. Financial experts without such incentives do not exert any systematic influence. As the last step in our analysis, we turn to a corporate decision for which the interests of financial institutions and shareholders do not conflict, but financial expertise is still valuable: the design of executive compensation.
The common rationale for stock-based compensation is to align CEO and shareholder interests. It is, however, debated whether the explosion of option compensation in the 1990s was the solution to or the result of such agency problems. One view is that it reflects changing CEO incentives over the last two decades (Gabaix and Landier, 2006 ).
An alternative view is that the emergence of stock options allowed CEOs to extract additional rents since options are less transparent than cash (e.g., they did not need to be expensed in annual reports) and therefore less likely to violate the shareholders' "outrage constraint" (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . From both perspectives, more financial literacy of directors is desirable -either to implement option compensation or to prevent abuses.
In Second, we ask whether financial expertise affects pay-to-performance sensitivity.
We relate changes in the natural logarithms of one plus total compensation (Column III) and one plus cash compensation (Columns IV) to current and lagged stock performance,
following Hall and Liebman (1998) . 42 We find that finance professors are associated with lower sensitivity. For bankers and other finance experts, we do not find significant effects other than one negative coefficient for investment bankers.
Perhaps surprisingly, finance professors appear to simultaneously increase the size of option grants and to reduce or not affect pay-performance sensitivity. Since the value consequences of pay-performance sensitivity are difficult to assess, the estimated effects are consistent with (at least) two interpretations. One interpretation is that increased option grants improve incentives and our pay-performance model does not detect the improvement since it neglects the effect of stock price changes on CEO stock and option holdings. Another possibility is that finance professors facilitate additional stock option grants, and perhaps unintentionally, foster CEO rent extraction.
Overall, there is little evidence that financial expertise on the board matters at all for compensation policies. Without strong incentives (as in the case of loans for commercial bankers and in the case of security issuances for investment bankers), financial experts appear to exert little detectable influence on firm policies.
V. Conclusion
This paper tests whether directors with financial expertise exert significant influence on corporate decisions and, if so, whether they serve shareholders' interests. We employ a novel long-term panel dataset, which allows us to move beyond the cross-sectional analysis prevalent in previous literature. We find that finance experts significantly affect the finance and investment policies of firms on whose board they serve. Commercial bankers 42 We splice cash compensation from ExecuComp (TCC) with the sum of salary and bonus from Hall and Liebman. We splice total compensation from ExecuComp (TDC1) with the sum of salary, bonus, other compensation, restricted stock grants and the Black-Scholes value of options grants from Hall-Liebman. Ideally, we would also measure how changes in performance affect CEO wealth (including existing stock and option holdings). Unfortunately, Execucomp does not provide data on individual option packages.
reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash flow by extending large loans, particularly through the director's bank. However, firms that are financially constrained do not benefit from the additional financing. Banker directors increase financing only to firms with good credit and minimal financial constraints, but poor investment opportunities. These results suggest that banker-directors act in the interests of creditors. Investment bankers are associated with larger debt issues, but also with worse acquisitions. Searching for a silver lining, we test whether financial experts improve policies when their interests are not in conflict with those of shareholders. In the context of executive option grants and pay-to-performance sensitivity, we find little evidence to support this hypothesis.
Our findings suggest that the recent quest for increased financial expertise on boards should be implemented with caution. The impact of board members on firm policies goes beyond mere monitoring, and is affected by director interests that conflict with those of shareholders. While the overall impact of financial experts on shareholder value is difficult to assess, specific policies -like financing, investment, and compensation -do The amount that the borrower pays the lender each year for each dollar borrowed in the case of a term loan, and for each dollar drawn off a credit line in the case of a loan commitment. The drawn all-in spread equals the coupon spread plus the annual fee. Most spreads are measured as a markup over LIBOR. In cases where they are based on another benchmark, LPC makes adjustments to the drawn all-in spreads, by assuming the following rates: Prime = +255 bps, Cost of funds = 0 bps, Commercial paper = 3 bps, T-bills = −34bps, Fed funds = 0 bps, Money market rate = 0 bps, Banker's acceptance = −18 bps, CDS = −6 bps (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001b).
Maturity
Natural logarithm of the number of days between the loan origination and the maturity.
Deal or Tranche Loan value in U.S. dollars. A deal may include several loan facilities at the same time. The most typical arrangement is a loan agreement that comprises a term loan and a revolver credit line.
Senior Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is senior. Secured Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is secured. Since this variable is often missing (for about one-third of the sample), a dummy for missing cases is also included in all regressions (not shown).
Year Dummy variables for the calendar years in which a loan agreement is signed. Loan Style Dummy variables for "Revolver", "Limited Line", "Bridge Loan", "Demand Loan", "364-day facility" and "Other." The omitted case is "Term Loan."
Loan Purpose Dummy variables for "Acquisition line", "CP backup", "Debt repay", "Debtor-inpossession financing", "ESOP", "LBO/MBO", "Project finance", "Real estate", "Recapitalization", "Securities purchase", "Spin-off", "Stock buyback", "Takeover" and "Working capital." The omitted case is "Corp. purposes."
Public Debt Variables (Source: SDC)
At-issue yield Yield-to-maturity in basis points as a spread over the relevant treasury benchmark.
Gross spread Underwriter fees as a percentage of the principal issued.
Maturity
The number of days between the loan origination and the maturity Principal Issue size in U.S. dollars.
OTC
Indicates whether the issue is listed over the counter.
Indicators included in estimations but not shown in tables:

CALL dummies
Indicators for each of the call covenant descriptions given by SDC: "Non-call life," "Non-callable," "Non-call/refund," "Non-refundable," "Make whole call." PUT Indicates whether the SDC gives a description of the put covenant. SINK Indicates whether the issue involves a sinking-funds provision. FLOAT Indicates whether the coupon rate is not fixed. 
Unaffiliated
The sample period is 1988-2001. Panel A provides summary statistics for director-years. All variables other than Age, Tenure and Number of Other Directorships are dummy variables indicating the director's career. Panels B and C describe firm-years. Firm characteristics are from Compustat Annual (item numbers in parentheses): Assets are total assets (6), Capital is property, plant, and equipment (8), Investment is capital expenditures (128), Cash Flow is earnings before extraordinary items (18) plus depreciation (14). Tobin's Q is the market value of assets over total assets (6), where market value is total assets plus market equity (25*199) minus book equity (6-181-10+35+79). Return on Assets (ROA) is income (18+15+50+51) divided by the average of current and lagged total assets. Return on Equity (ROE) is net income (172) scaled by the average of current and lagged book equity. Altman's z-score is defined as 3.3 times the difference in operating income before depreciation (13) and depreciation and amortization (14) plus sales (12) OLS regressions with Investment as the dependent variable, defined as capital expenditures normalized by lagged capital. Cash Flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, normalized by lagged capital. Q is the (lagged) ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of lagged book assets. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. Board Independence is the ratio of the number of outside directors to board size. 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 Ye ar Robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
OLS regressions with Investment as dependent variable, defined as capital expenditures normalized by lagged capital. Constrained (unconstrained) firms are those with lagged Kaplan-Zingales index values above (below) the sample median. Cash Flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, normalized by lagged capital. Q is the (lagged) ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of lagged book assets. Robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
OLS regressions with Loan Size (Tranche) in $ millions as the dependent variable. Firms are constrained (unconstrained) when their lagged Kaplan-Zingales index is above (below) the full sample median.COMBANKER is an indicator variable for the presence of a commercial banker on the board; IBANKER indicates an investment banker. Executives of Non-bank Financial Companies, Financial Executives & Accountants, and Finance Professors are dummy variables indicating the presence of such a director on the board. Affiliated COMBANKER indicates that a commercial-banker director's bank is among the originators of the loan. Unaffiliated COMBANKER indicates that commercial bankers are present on the board, but their banks are not involved in the loan. Controls for firm characteristics are Q (market value of assets over the book value of assets), Firm Size (natural logarithm of total book assets), PPE/Assets (plants, property and equipment scaled by assets), Leverage (long term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by long term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus stockholders' equity), Stock Volatility (measured over the 12 months preceding the loan initiation), and S&P credit rating fixed effects, using the S&P long-term debt rating-categories. Controls for board characteristics are Board Size (natural logarithm of number of directors on the board) and Board Independence (ratio of outside directors to board size). Controls for deal characteristics are Maturity (natural logarithm of the days to maturity), Senior (dummy indicating that the debt has a priority over other debt obligations of the company), Secured (dummy indicating that the deal involves a lien on borrower assets, guarantees, or other collateral), Number of Lenders (number of banks involved), Syndicated (dummy indicating whether the loan comes from a syndicate of banks) and indicators for loan style, loan purpose, and missing observations for the maturity and secured variables. Industry indicators are coded according to the 48 Fama-French industry groups. All standard errors are clustered by firm.
The first six panels depict the sample means of ROA, ROE, and Q net of the full sample industry median. Industry is measured using the 48 Fama and French industry groups. If there are less than 5 sample firms in a category, the Fama-French 17 group is used; if there are less than 5 sample firms in this group, the Fama-French 12 group is used. The last two panels depicts unadjusted sample-mean Altman's Z-scores. ROA is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus deferred taxes (when available) plus income tax credit (when available), divided by the average of current and lagged book assets. ROE is net income divided by the average of current and lagged book equity. Z-score is 3.3 times the difference in operating income before depreciation and depreciation and amortization plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital, divided by book assets. Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Constrained (unconstrained) firms are those with lagged Kaplan-Zingales index values above (below) the full sample median. Year 0 indicates the fiscal year in which the firm has obtained at least one bank loan. Affiliated indicates that a commercial banker is present on the board at the time of the loan and that the director's bank is among the loan's originators. Unaffiliated indicates that a commercial banker is present on the board, but his/her bank is not involved in the loan. No banker indicates that no commercial banker sits on the board at the time of the loan. 
Figure 3. Long Run Stock Performance Around Mergers
The figures show stock performance around mergers in event time. Month 0 is the month in which the firm announced a merger bid. The sample includes all completed deals with target shares acquired > 50% and deal value > $5M. Leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, self-tenders, acquisitions of subsidiaries, spin-offs, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, privatizations, and acquisitions of remaining interests are excluded. In the legend, "ibanker" indicates that an investment banker is present on the board at the time of the merger bid and "no ibanker" indicates the opposite. All returns are buy and hold, i.e. compounded monthly over the relevant interval. For months 0 to 36, the figures display buy and hold returns from month 0 to month x. For months -36 to 0, the figures display buy and hold returns from month -x to 0, downward shifted so that the cumulative return as of month 0 is 0. In the left figure, monthly raw returns are compounded for each merger event and then averaged across events within the no ibanker and ibanker subsamples. In the right figure, market returns (CRSP value-weighted index) are first subtracted off the monthly raw returns before compounding.
Raw Buy-and-Hold Returns -36 -32 -28 -24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 14 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Constant included. T-statistics (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-corrected and clustered by firm.
OLS regressions with the following dependent variable: an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO receives any option grant in Column I; the natural logarithm of one plus the Black-Scholes value of option grants in Column II; the change in the natural logarithm of one plus total compensation in Column III; and the change in the natural logarithm of one plus cash compensation in Column IV. Compensation data is from the Hall-Liebman (1998) for 1988 to 1994 and from ExecuComp from 1995 forward. All regressions include a dummy variable which takes the value 1 in the Execucomp sample years. R is common stock returns over the fiscal year. Column I includes controls for Board Independence, Board Size, and their interactions with R t and R t-1 , as well as controls for Firm Size, CEO Age, CEO Tenure, year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Financial expertise variables are dummies which take the value 1 when a director of the type in question is present. Board Size is the natural logarithm of number of directors on the board. Board Independence is the ratio of outsiders to board size. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of assets at the beginning of the year. Columns III and IV also include the interactions of Board Independence and Board Size with R t and R t-1 . 
